A free account is required to play audio and download files.
No community start suggestion yet.
Why isn't a woman obligated in pidyon haben for her son? The shiur develops a fundamental yesod: pidyon haben is not merely redeeming the bechor from kedusha, but a father's active commitment of "bechor bonecha titein li" — dedicating the child to avodas Hashem (ה׳). Women are exempt because they are not subject to this hischayvus, explaining the Gemara (גמרא)'s otherwise difficult logic and the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s enigmatic formulation.
The shiur on Kiddushin 29a begins by examining the Gemara (גמרא)'s complex chain of reasoning for why a woman is exempt from pidyon haben. The Gemara states: whoever is not obligated to redeem themselves cannot redeem others; whoever others are not obligated to redeem cannot redeem themselves; and since "bonecha v'lo b'nosecha" (your sons, not your daughters), women are exempt. The Maharsha raises a fundamental difficulty: why does the Gemara go through unnecessary steps? It should simply say that since others are not obligated to redeem her, she is not obligated to redeem her son. Why insert the intermediate step that she's not obligated to redeem herself? Tosafos (תוספות) asks an even more basic question: why do we need a pasuk to teach that if others aren't obligated to redeem her, she doesn't redeem herself? Isn't that obvious — she has no kedushas bechor! Tosafos answers that perhaps she does have kedushas bechor, but the father is simply exempt from his daughter, while she herself would be obligated when grown. This answer itself requires explanation: if she has kedushas bechor, why would the father be exempt?
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Kiddushin 29a
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
