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When can indirect language (yad) effect kiddushin? The Ran holds that yad mochiach itself is the Gemara (גמרא)'s uncertainty; the shiur argues this cannot be reconciled with Tosfos, who says such language would work "if not for other reasons." Building on the Rashba, Rabbi Zweig develops a fundamental chakira: kiddushin requires witnesses to a maaseh kiddushin—not merely an interpretation of intent. Context that clarifies meaning is part of what witnesses "see"; external commentary explaining ambiguous words is not.
This shiur analyzes Masechta Nedarim's discussion of whether indirect language (yad) can create valid kiddushin. The core sugya examines the case where a man gives kiddushin to woman A and says "ve'at" (and you) to woman B. The Gemara (גמרא)'s fundamental question is whether yad mochiach—language that clearly indicates intent even without explicit terminology—is effective for kiddushin. The Ran frames this as the Gemara's central uncertainty: does yad work for kiddushin or not? Rabbi Zweig identifies a fundamental difficulty with the Ran's approach. Tosfos states that if the language had no other meaning besides kiddushin, it would work—implying that yad itself could be effective. But if yad mochiach is the very subject of the Gemara's doubt, how can Tosfos assume it would work? This creates a contradiction: Tosfos seems to assume yad is effective, while the Ran says the Gemara is uncertain about this very point.
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Nedarim (discussion of yad l'kidushin)
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