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Why can't kesef work for both kiddushin and gerushin, while shtar does? The Gemara (גמרא)'s cryptic principle "ein kateiguer naaseh saneguer" reveals that marriage and divorce aren't simply opposite transactions but fundamentally different realities. A divorced woman never returns to her pre-married state—she remains forever connected to her first husband—which explains why the same kinyan cannot function both ways.
This shiur addresses a fundamental question in Kiddushin 5a: why the Gemara (גמרא) uses the language of "hachnasa" (bringing in) and "hotza'ah" (taking out) rather than "kinyan" when discussing kiddushin through kesef, and what is meant by the enigmatic principle "ein kateiguer naaseh saneguer" (the prosecutor cannot become the defender). The Gemara attempts a kal vachomer: if kesef, which cannot do girushin, can do nisuin, then surely shtar, which does work for girushin, should work for kiddushin. The rejection of a parallel hekesh—that just as shtar does both kiddushin and gerushin, kesef should also do both—is puzzling, especially given the principle "ein meshivin al hekesh" (we don't refute a hekesh with logical objections). The Gemara's answer seems to be merely a perception issue: "yomru kesef machnis, kesef motzi"—people will say that what brings in also takes out.
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Kiddushin 5a
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