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When a dog takes burning coals and spreads a fire, who pays for the damage — the coal owner, the dog owner, or both? The Gemara (גמרא)'s answer ("he was guarding the coals") reveals a fundamental debate between Rashi (רש"י), the Rambam (רמב"ם), and the Raavad about fire liability, koach acher me'oravo, and whether esh is considered adam ha'mazik or mamon ha'mazik.
This shiur analyzes a complex sugya in Bava Kamma 23a dealing with a case where someone's dog takes burning coals (gachalot) and spreads them, causing fire damage in two places: where the coal is placed (makom ha'gacheles) and where the fire spreads further (makom acharon). The Gemara (גמרא) asks why both the owner of the coals and the owner of the dog shouldn't share liability for the entire damage (sha'ar ha'gadesh). The Gemara's answer is cryptic: "he was guarding the coals" (shomer gachalto). But this implies that if he was NOT guarding the coals (lo shomer gachalto), there should be joint liability. Rabbi Zweig demonstrates that the Rishonim read this answer in fundamentally different ways.
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Bava Kamma 23a
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