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Can coerced transactions create valid kinyanim? The Gemara (גמרא)'s rule "talui b'koneh zavin zavin" permits forced sales but not forced purchases. The shiur analyzes the Rashba vs. Baal HaIttur debate over whether passive acquiescence suffices for kinyan or whether active transfer is required, and applies this to both monetary transactions and kiddushin.
This shiur analyzes the Gemara (גמרא) on Kiddushin 2b dealing with whether coercion (ba'al korchah) can effectuate kiddushin. The Rashba raises the question: why does the Gemara need a separate teaching to exclude coerced kiddushin when it seems obvious that without consent, there can be no valid kiddushin? He explains that we might have thought the principle "talui b'koneh zavin zavin" (forced sales are valid) from Bava Basra would apply equally to kiddushin, requiring the Gemara's exclusion. The core machloket between the Rashba and the Baal HaIttur concerns which direction coercion works: the Rashba holds that forcing someone to acquire (talui b'koneh) should work even if forcing someone to sell (talui b'zavin) doesn't, because acquisition is easier than transfer. The Baal HaIttur maintains the opposite – forced sales work but forced acquisitions don't. Rabbi Zweig develops a fundamental distinction between passive and active kinyan to resolve the machloket. The question is: when someone acts under duress, is the person passively acquiescing to what the coercer wants (allowing it to happen), or actively agreeing to perform the desired action? According to the Raavad's approach, saying "rotzeh ani" (I want) transforms a passive acceptance into an active sale. Without those words, the person is merely not resisting while the other party takes – making it theft (chamas) rather than a sale, even if technically a kinyan occurs. With "rotzeh ani," the seller actively transfers the object, converting it to a genuine sale. This distinction explains why the Raavad requires "rotzeh ani" for kiddushin – because kiddushin requires the man to actively acquire (ki yikach), not merely passively accept. In monetary kinyanim, passive acquisition suffices, but for kiddushin, the Torah (תורה) demands active performance.
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Kiddushin 2b
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