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If Adam HaRishon was already prohibited from eating any meat, why did the Torah (תורה) need a separate prohibition of ever min hachai? The shiur analyzes how Tosfos and the Rambam (רמב"ם) understand these as manifestations of one principle: not eating what isn't designated as food. This explains why Noach needed explicit clarification about ever min hachai when meat consumption was permitted.
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of Sanhedrin 56b, focusing on the prohibition of ever min hachai (eating a limb from a living animal) and the complex interpretations offered by Rashi (רש"י) and Tosfos. The Gemara (גמרא) establishes that the source for this prohibition comes from the pasuk 'achol tochel,' which teaches that one should eat what is prepared for eating, not what is meant for procreation - since living animals are designed for reproduction, not consumption. The discussion begins with a technical question: since an animal doesn't need all its limbs for reproduction, perhaps those unnecessary limbs should be permitted. However, the analysis moves to more fundamental issues. Tosfos raises a significant question based on a Gemara in Nedarim stating that Adam HaRishon was not permitted to eat meat at all, as the pasuk indicates vegetables were given for human and animal consumption, but animals were not given for human consumption.
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Sanhedrin 56b
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