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Why can't wood that falls from a tree on Shabbos (שבת) be used on Yom Tov that immediately follows? The Gemara (גמרא) permits adding permitted wood to nullify the muktzeh wood, raising the question of whether one may be mevatel issur l'chatchila on a d'rabbanan. Multiple approaches are explored regarding the nature of muktzeh, davar she'yesh lo matirin, and tiltul min ha'tzad.
The shiur analyzes a complex Gemara (גמרא) in Beitzah 4b dealing with wood that falls from a tree on Shabbos (שבת) and its permissibility for use on Yom Tov. The Mishna states that such wood is forbidden for kindling on Yom Tov, which appears to contradict Rabbi Yochanan's ruling that an egg laid on Shabbos is permitted on Yom Tov. The Gemara resolves this by distinguishing between an egg, which could theoretically be eaten raw on Shabbos (making its prohibition well-known), and wood, which has no immediate use on Shabbos itself. The core question becomes whether one may add permitted wood to nullify the forbidden muktzeh wood (bittul b'rov), which raises the fundamental issue of whether one may be mevatel issur l'chatchila (nullify a prohibition intentionally from the outset). The Gemara initially asks how this could be permitted, given the principle of ein mevatel issur l'chatchila. The Gemara responds that this principle applies only to Torah (תורה) prohibitions, but Rabbinic prohibitions may be nullified intentionally.
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Beitzah 4b
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