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Does someone have nicho l'olam on a lulav and esrog, such that another person may fulfill the mitzvah (מצוה) using it without explicit permission? The discussion explores whether these arba minim, which can be damaged or ruined, qualify for the nicho l'olam principle, comparing the lulav (which might get broken) to the esrog (which people treat with particular care).
This brief shiur fragment explores a fundamental question in the laws of lulav and esrog: whether the halachic principle of nicho l'olam mitzvah (מצוה) u'mona applies to the four species. Nicho l'olam is a concept whereby a person is assumed to be pleased when someone else uses his property to perform a mitzvah, even without explicit permission. The discussion centers on whether this presumption extends to a lulav and esrog. The shiur distinguishes between different scenarios. When someone maliciously takes another's lulav, there is certainly no nicho l'olam. But what about when an innocent person picks it up? The question is whether the owner would be pleased that someone else used his lulav to fulfill the mitzvah.
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Sukkah 29b-30a
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When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
