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Does someone have nicho l'olam on a lulav and esrog, such that another person may fulfill the mitzvah (מצוה) using it without explicit permission? The discussion explores whether these arba minim, which can be damaged or ruined, qualify for the nicho l'olam principle, comparing the lulav (which might get broken) to the esrog (which people treat with particular care).
This brief shiur fragment explores a fundamental question in the laws of lulav and esrog: whether the halachic principle of nicho l'olam mitzvah (מצוה) u'mona applies to the four species. Nicho l'olam is a concept whereby a person is assumed to be pleased when someone else uses his property to perform a mitzvah, even without explicit permission. The discussion centers on whether this presumption extends to a lulav and esrog. The shiur distinguishes between different scenarios. When someone maliciously takes another's lulav, there is certainly no nicho l'olam. But what about when an innocent person picks it up? The question is whether the owner would be pleased that someone else used his lulav to fulfill the mitzvah.
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Sukkah 29b-30a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
