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Can an aseh override a lo taaseh punishable by kares in the context of yibum? The shiur presents several fundamental challenges to the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion: if kiddushin doesn't take effect with chayavei krisus, how can yibum work at all? And how can we speak of aseh docheh lo taaseh when only the man has the mitzvah (מצוה) while both have the issur?
This shiur analyzes Yevamos 3b, which discusses the principle of aseh docheh lo taaseh she'yesh bo kares (whether a positive commandment can override a prohibition punishable by kares) in the context of yibum. Rabbi Zweig presents multiple foundational questions on the Gemara (גמרא)'s logic and assumptions. The Gemara asks whether aseh docheh lo taaseh she'yesh bo kares. The first major difficulty raised is fundamental: if we're dealing with chayavei krisus (prohibited relations punishable by kares), then kiddushin should not be tofes (take effect) at all. The Gemara later states explicitly that by chayavei lavin (regular prohibitions), kiddushin is tofes, which is why one can fulfill the mitzvah (מצוה) of yibum despite the issur. But by chayavei krisus, kiddushin is not tofes. If kiddushin isn't tofes, then how can the woman become the yavam's wife through yibum? And if she doesn't become his wife, how has he fulfilled the mitzvah of yibum at all? The Gemara's entire discussion of aseh docheh seems irrelevant—the fundamental mechanism of yibum shouldn't work.
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Yevamos 3b
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