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Why does a get require kiyum (authentication) by witnesses when the Torah (תורה) itself establishes that witnesses who sign a document are credible? The shiur analyzes the machlokes Rambam (רמב"ם)-Ramban (רמב"ן) whether shtaros are d'oraisa or d'rabbanan, exploring whether eidim chatumim can be validated through the chazaka of lo chotef inish l'zayef. The discussion reveals fundamental tensions about what chashash kiyum addresses—forgery, found documents, or lack of lishmah.
The Gemara (גמרא) on Gittin 3a presents a fundamental question about kiyum shtaros (authentication of documents): why do we need kiyum when the Torah (תורה) establishes that eidim chatumim al hashtar (witnesses signed on a document) have the status of eidim she'ne'echravu u'she'nechtamu b'beis din (witnesses whose testimony was confirmed in court)? If witnesses who sign are automatically credible d'oraisa, what necessitates the rabbinic requirement of kiyum? The Gemara's answer introduces the principle of ein makasum ela shtar—people generally do not forge documents due to the chazaka of lo chotef inish l'zayef (the presumption that people lack the audacity to forge). This chazaka removes the d'oraisa concern about forgery. However, the Rabbanan instituted a d'rabbanan chashash of ziyuf (concern for forgery), requiring kiyum through comparison of signatures to eliminate even the rabbinic-level concern.
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Gittin 3a
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