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Does kocho k'gufo (a person's force is like his body) obligate an owner for stones propelled by his animal's hooves? The shiur analyzes Rava's safek: whether kocho k'gufo extends liability to tzeroros (pebbles), or whether the owner remains exempt unless halacha (הלכה) l'Moshe miSinai establishes a separate din. The analysis clarifies that kocho k'gufo creates liability only from the animal's direct action, not from indirect damage caused by the animal's force.
This shiur on Bava Kamma 19a centers on Rava's fundamental safek (doubt) regarding the scope of the principle of kocho k'gufo (one's force is like one's body) as it applies to damage caused by tzeroros—stones or pebbles kicked up by an animal's hooves. The core question is whether the owner of an animal is liable for damage caused not by the animal's body itself (gufo mamash), but by stones propelled by the force of the animal's movement. Rabbi Zweig explains that according to Rashi (רש"י), there is no obligation of kofer (ransom payment for unintentional manslaughter) when the damage is caused by tzeroros. Rashi holds that kofer applies only when the animal's body itself (gufo mamash) causes the death, through goring or similar direct acts. This raises a fundamental question: if tzeroros are not considered the animal's gufo, then on what basis would the owner be liable at all?
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Bava Kamma 19a
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