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What is the status of a ger katon who declares 'higdili echol limchos' - does this statement retroactively nullify his conversion or only stop the process going forward? The shiur develops Rashi (רש"י)'s position that higdili echol limchos creates a 'miktzas ger' status - neither full Jew nor full goy. This explains why beis din cannot punish him for past acts and why kiddushin performed after his declaration lacks validity.
The shiur analyzes Kesubos 11a regarding a ger katon (minor convert) who declares 'higdili echol limchos' (I reject all of these obligations) upon reaching maturity. The central question is whether this declaration works retroactively (l'mafrayah) to nullify his entire conversion history, or only affects his status going forward (mikan v'eilach). Rashi (רש"י)'s commentary presents a puzzle: he states both that beis din cannot punish the former ger for transgressions committed while he was considered Jewish, and separately that any kiddushin (marriage) he performs after his declaration is invalid and requires no get. This dual formulation suggests Rashi is making a subtle distinction about the ger's status.
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Kesubos 11a
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