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The Mishna's "ha'isha niknes" describes erusin, not nisuin—so where does the Gemara (גמרא) define how a married woman becomes permitted to remarry? The shiur examines Rashi (רש"י), Tosafos (תוספות), and especially three contradictory Rambams: kesuva is repeatedly called derabanan, yet the Rambam (רמב"ם) writes that kedusha *and* kesuva are both Torah (תורה) requirements for marriage. The analysis touches on the lav of kedasha, the difference between pelegesh and wife, and whether "niknes" implies full marriage or only kiddushin.
The shiur opens with a striking observation: the Mishna in Kiddushin 2a discusses how a woman is acquired ("ha'isha niknes"), but the entire Mishna addresses only *arusah* (a betrothed woman), not a fully married woman (nesuah). This raises the fundamental question: where in the Mishna does the Gemara (גמרא) teach how a married woman becomes permitted to another man (e.g., through divorce or death)? Rabbi Zweig then turns to Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafos (תוספות) on the opening words "ha'isha niknes." Tosafos raises a textual difficulty: why does the Mishna say "*ha*isha" with the definite article, rather than simply "isha"? Tosafos suggests the word "ha" is a demonstrative ("*this* woman"), but the shiur presses: what did Tosafos originally assume the word "ha'isha" meant, such that its inclusion would *not* be a problem? This leads into a broader discussion of the Mishna's language and whether "niknes" refers only to erusin or carries implications for full nisuin as well.
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Kiddushin 2a
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