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Why can't a man be mekadesh a woman with a loan he gave her? The Gemara (גמרא)'s principle "milveh l'hotza'ah nitna" is explored through Rashi (רש"י)'s two apparently contradictory formulations: is the loan money "like hers" (k'dido) or "already hers" (dido mamash)? The shiur builds a yesod that kiddushin demands a real transfer—not just technical legal chalos—and that both parties must experience genuine hana'ah in the transaction.
The shiur opens on Kiddushin 6b with a textual anomaly: Abaye states "hamakadesh b'milveh ein m'kudeshes" (one who betroths with a loan is not betrothed), yet Rav already taught this principle hundreds of years earlier on daf 47a. Why would Abaye repeat Rav's teaching without attribution or addition? Rabbi Zweig suggests Abaye must be introducing a new chiddush about milveh that Rav did not articulate. The Gemara (גמרא)'s core issue is what it means to be mekadesh b'milveh. Rashi (רש"י) explains: the man lent the woman money previously, and that money is still physically present ("yeshno be'einah"), sitting on her table. He now says, "Be betrothed to me with the loan that is in your purse." The question is why this does not constitute valid kiddushin. Rashi on 47a offers the principle "milveh l'hotza'ah nitna"—a loan is given to be spent. The borrower has the right to spend the money however she wishes; she need not preserve it or invest it to protect the lender's ability to collect. Therefore, the money is "k'dido"—like hers—and the lender is not giving her anything new at the moment of kiddushin.
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Kiddushin 6b
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