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Why can't a man be mekadesh a woman with a loan he gave her? The Gemara (גמרא)'s principle "milveh l'hotza'ah nitna" is explored through Rashi (רש"י)'s two apparently contradictory formulations: is the loan money "like hers" (k'dido) or "already hers" (dido mamash)? The shiur builds a yesod that kiddushin demands a real transfer—not just technical legal chalos—and that both parties must experience genuine hana'ah in the transaction.
The shiur opens on Kiddushin 6b with a textual anomaly: Abaye states "hamakadesh b'milveh ein m'kudeshes" (one who betroths with a loan is not betrothed), yet Rav already taught this principle hundreds of years earlier on daf 47a. Why would Abaye repeat Rav's teaching without attribution or addition? Rabbi Zweig suggests Abaye must be introducing a new chiddush about milveh that Rav did not articulate. The Gemara (גמרא)'s core issue is what it means to be mekadesh b'milveh. Rashi (רש"י) explains: the man lent the woman money previously, and that money is still physically present ("yeshno be'einah"), sitting on her table. He now says, "Be betrothed to me with the loan that is in your purse." The question is why this does not constitute valid kiddushin. Rashi on 47a offers the principle "milveh l'hotza'ah nitna"—a loan is given to be spent. The borrower has the right to spend the money however she wishes; she need not preserve it or invest it to protect the lender's ability to collect. Therefore, the money is "k'dido"—like hers—and the lender is not giving her anything new at the moment of kiddushin.
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Kiddushin 6b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
