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Can muktzah from one day carry over to the next? Tosafos (תוספות) in Beitzah 4a rejects muktzah machmis yom shavar—muktzah caused only by yesterday's prohibition. The shiur explores whether this means yesterday's muktzah simply disappears, or whether the principle is that muktzah-prohibited items can still be designated (hachana) for tomorrow when the prohibition stems from yesterday rather than today.
This shiur analyzes a fundamental Tosafos (תוספות) in Masechta Beitzah 4a concerning the concept of muktzah machmis yom shavar—muktzah that results from a prohibition on the previous day. The Gemara (גמרא) discusses a case where an egg is laid on Shabbos (שבת) followed by Yom Tov, or vice versa. Rav holds there is no hachana derabbah (rabbinical preparation requirement), which would seemingly permit eating the egg on the second day even though it was muktzah on the first. Tosafos raises a fundamental question: why doesn't the principle of "migud iksatzoy bein hashemoshos, iksatzoy lekul yom" (if something is prohibited during bein hashemoshos, it is prohibited for the entire day) apply here? If the egg was muktzah during the twilight period between the two days, it should remain muktzah throughout the second day as well.
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Beitzah 4a
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