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Why can't a woman be acquired through chalipin (exchange) when it's worth a sheveh pruta? The Gemara (גמרא) could equally ask why shtar shouldn't work when it contains value. Tosafos (תוספות) proves shtar doesn't operate as an exchange—even with issurei hana'ah—so it's fundamentally different from chalipin, which resembles kesef.
This shiur analyzes Tosafos (תוספות) on Kiddushin 3a-b, exploring the Gemara (גמרא)'s question about why chalipin (exchange) cannot effect kiddushin even when the item exchanged has monetary value (sheveh pruta). The fundamental tension is that since chalipin resembles kesef (money), it should work for kiddushin when the exchanged item has value, just as regular kesef does. Rabbi Zweig presents the Rishonim's distinction between genai (disrespect) and being makpid (having particular expectations). When a woman is makpid—she has certain standards or expectations—her acceptance (pashut yada) can overcome that reluctance. However, genai represents an inherent disrespect to the woman. Even if she accepts it (batla daita—she forgoes her objection), the act itself remains disrespectful. The fact that she's willing to accept disrespect doesn't transform the act into something respectful; it merely indicates low self-esteem. This explains why certain forms of acquisition that are inherently degrading cannot effect kiddushin regardless of her acceptance.
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Kiddushin 3a-b
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