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When a husband violates rabbinic law by nullifying a get (divorce), how do Chazal invalidate the marriage? The shiur explores two approaches: whether afkina rabanan lekidushin (rabbinic annulment) stems from the husband's implicit consent at the time of marriage, or from Chazal's inherent authority to enforce their rulings. The distinction affects whether annulment is limited to cases protecting the integrity of marriage or extends to any rabbinic violation.
This shiur presents an in-depth analysis of Gittin 33a, focusing on the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of afkina rabanan lekidushin mine—the power of Chazal to retroactively annul a marriage. The central question is how the Sages can nullify a Torah (תורה)-level marriage when a husband improperly nullifies a get against rabbinic decree. The Gemara presents a fundamental machloket between Rebbe and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel regarding whether a husband can nullify a get. Both agree that the husband should not do so (din d'isur), but they dispute whether the nullification takes effect. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that even if the husband nullifies the get, it remains valid due to afkina rabanan lekidushin mine. The Gemara asks: if this is merely inkai makach bezin yafa (market integrity—ensuring that agreements have value), why is the woman not considered an eishes ish (married woman)? How can Chazal permit what appears to be living with a married woman?
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Gittin 33a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
