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When a husband violates rabbinic law by nullifying a get (divorce), how do Chazal invalidate the marriage? The shiur explores two approaches: whether afkina rabanan lekidushin (rabbinic annulment) stems from the husband's implicit consent at the time of marriage, or from Chazal's inherent authority to enforce their rulings. The distinction affects whether annulment is limited to cases protecting the integrity of marriage or extends to any rabbinic violation.
This shiur presents an in-depth analysis of Gittin 33a, focusing on the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of afkina rabanan lekidushin mine—the power of Chazal to retroactively annul a marriage. The central question is how the Sages can nullify a Torah (תורה)-level marriage when a husband improperly nullifies a get against rabbinic decree. The Gemara presents a fundamental machloket between Rebbe and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel regarding whether a husband can nullify a get. Both agree that the husband should not do so (din d'isur), but they dispute whether the nullification takes effect. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that even if the husband nullifies the get, it remains valid due to afkina rabanan lekidushin mine. The Gemara asks: if this is merely inkai makach bezin yafa (market integrity—ensuring that agreements have value), why is the woman not considered an eishes ish (married woman)? How can Chazal permit what appears to be living with a married woman?
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Gittin 33a
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