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Why does Rashi (רש"י) hold you can fulfill the mitzvah (מצוה) of sukkah with stolen wood when there's been a shinui? The shiur works through Rashi's position that sukkah requires only "lecha" (ownership sufficient for shutfut), whereas lulav requires "lachem" (exclusive ownership). When you have both takanat hashavim and a shinui hashem (ה׳)/shinui ma'aseh achoz l'briyoso, you've created lachem twice — removing the mitzvah haba'ah ba'aveira disqualification.
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of the Gemara (גמרא) in Sukkah 31a-b regarding stolen wood used for a sukkah (sukkah gezulah). The discussion revolves around a fundamental contradiction between two Gemaras and focuses on understanding Rashi (רש"י)'s approach and the difficulties raised by Tosfos. The Gemara on 31a presents a case where Rabbanan were sitting in a sukkah gezulah and a woman was screaming about her stolen property. Rav Nachman ignored her, applying the principle "ein lo ela demei eitzim b'vad" — she's only entitled to monetary compensation, not the actual wood back. The Gemara establishes that this works because of takanat hashavim (the Rabbinic enactment that permits keeping stolen property in certain circumstances) and applies to cases involving shinui hashem (ה׳) and shinui ma'aseh (changes in name and essence).
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Sukkah 31a
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