A free account is required to play audio and download files.
No community start suggestion yet.
Why does Rashi (רש"י) hold you can fulfill the mitzvah (מצוה) of sukkah with stolen wood when there's been a shinui? The shiur works through Rashi's position that sukkah requires only "lecha" (ownership sufficient for shutfut), whereas lulav requires "lachem" (exclusive ownership). When you have both takanat hashavim and a shinui hashem (ה׳)/shinui ma'aseh achoz l'briyoso, you've created lachem twice — removing the mitzvah haba'ah ba'aveira disqualification.
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of the Gemara (גמרא) in Sukkah 31a-b regarding stolen wood used for a sukkah (sukkah gezulah). The discussion revolves around a fundamental contradiction between two Gemaras and focuses on understanding Rashi (רש"י)'s approach and the difficulties raised by Tosfos. The Gemara on 31a presents a case where Rabbanan were sitting in a sukkah gezulah and a woman was screaming about her stolen property. Rav Nachman ignored her, applying the principle "ein lo ela demei eitzim b'vad" — she's only entitled to monetary compensation, not the actual wood back. The Gemara establishes that this works because of takanat hashavim (the Rabbinic enactment that permits keeping stolen property in certain circumstances) and applies to cases involving shinui hashem (ה׳) and shinui ma'aseh (changes in name and essence).
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Sukkah 31a
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
