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Why does the Gemara (גמרא) need a pasuk to permit maaseh Shabbos (שבת) after Shabbos, if there's no Torah (תורה) prohibition to begin with? The shiur distinguishes between the issur of using maaseh Shabbos on Shabbos itself (shmiras Shabbos) and the separate din of kosef toftilo (punitive loss after an aveira). The Rambam (רמב"ם) holds kosef toftilo only applies b'meizid, not b'shogeg, explaining why Rav Yochanan Sandler's position doesn't apply to inadvertent violations.
This shiur analyzes Bava Kama 71a and its discussion of maaseh Shabbos (שבת)—whether a Jew may benefit from work done on Shabbos. The Gemara (גמרא) presents a fundamental dispute: Rav Yehuda permits benefit to others after Shabbos but prohibits it forever to the one who did the melacha; Rav Yochanan Sandler prohibits it to everyone forever. The shiur focuses on resolving major difficulties in understanding this sugya, particularly addressing Tosafos (תוספות)'s questions and the Rif's cryptic language. The central problem begins with Tosafos's famous question: Why does the Gemara need a pasuk (kodesh hi, he) to teach that maaseh Shabbos is permitted after Shabbos? If there's no Torah (תורה) prohibition of maaseh Shabbos, the word "kodesh" in the verse seems superfluous—only the word "he" (excluding it from perpetual kedusha) would be necessary. Tosafos suggests the answer lies in kosef toftilo (punishment through loss), but this creates its own difficulties.
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Bava Kama 71a
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