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Why is a stolen lulav invalid even on the second day of Yom Tov, when there's no requirement of ownership? The shiur analyzes the relationship between the Torah (תורה)'s requirement of "lachem" (yours), the principle of mitzvah (מצוה) haba'ah b'aveirah, and the role of yiush (despair). It explores whether the invalidation applies even when the theft was unknowing (ones) and distinguishes between different types of aveirah in performing mitzvos.
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of Sukkah 29b-30a, focusing on the Mishna's ruling that a lulav hagazol (stolen lulav) is invalid. The shiur begins by reviewing the previous discussion of nifradu alav (when the leaves of the lulav have separated) and Rabbi Yehuda's requirement that it be tied. Rabbi Zweig explores whether tying is a bedieved or lechatchilah requirement, examining the positions of the Rambam (רמב"ם), Tur, Bach, and Rava Magid. The main focus shifts to understanding why a stolen lulav is invalid. The Gemara (גמרא) derives this from the verse "v'lakachtem lachem" - it must be "yours." But this raises an immediate question: on the second day of Yom Tov (which is derabbanan), there's no requirement of ownership - one may use a borrowed lulav. Why then can't one use a stolen lulav on the second day? The Gemara answers with the principle of mitzvah (מצוה) haba'ah b'aveirah - a mitzvah that comes through a sin.
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Sukkah 29b-30a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
