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Why is a stolen lulav invalid even on the second day of Yom Tov, when there's no requirement of ownership? The shiur analyzes the relationship between the Torah (תורה)'s requirement of "lachem" (yours), the principle of mitzvah (מצוה) haba'ah b'aveirah, and the role of yiush (despair). It explores whether the invalidation applies even when the theft was unknowing (ones) and distinguishes between different types of aveirah in performing mitzvos.
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of Sukkah 29b-30a, focusing on the Mishna's ruling that a lulav hagazol (stolen lulav) is invalid. The shiur begins by reviewing the previous discussion of nifradu alav (when the leaves of the lulav have separated) and Rabbi Yehuda's requirement that it be tied. Rabbi Zweig explores whether tying is a bedieved or lechatchilah requirement, examining the positions of the Rambam (רמב"ם), Tur, Bach, and Rava Magid. The main focus shifts to understanding why a stolen lulav is invalid. The Gemara (גמרא) derives this from the verse "v'lakachtem lachem" - it must be "yours." But this raises an immediate question: on the second day of Yom Tov (which is derabbanan), there's no requirement of ownership - one may use a borrowed lulav. Why then can't one use a stolen lulav on the second day? The Gemara answers with the principle of mitzvah (מצוה) haba'ah b'aveirah - a mitzvah that comes through a sin.
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Sukkah 29b-30a
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