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Why does the Mishna omit mechubar (attached land) from the list of invalid gittin when it's kosher for kiddushin? The Rosh and Ran explain that shtar kiddushin functions as a kinyan through exchange (like kesef), not as a formal document. This distinction resolves why mechubar works for kiddushin—since no ma'aseh nesinah is required, only ownership transfer—while remaining invalid for gittin that demand strict document protocol.
This shiur examines a fundamental question in the opening Gemara (גמרא) of Masechta Kiddushin: why doesn't the Mishna list mechubar (attached property) among the things invalid for gittin and shichrur avadim, given that mechubar is kosher for kiddushin? The shiur develops the answer through the Rosh and Ran's revolutionary understanding of shtar kiddushin. The Rosh explains that the reason mechubar is invalid for gittin is precisely why it's valid for kiddushin. Gittin requires a formal document (shtar) with proper eidim (witnesses) and transmission. Kiddushin through shtar, however, is fundamentally different—it operates as an exchange mechanism, analogous to kesef (money). Since it's an exchange rather than a document transfer, it doesn't require ma'aseh nesinah (an act of giving). All that's needed is for the woman to become the owner. Therefore mechubar can work for kiddushin because ownership can be transferred through attached property.
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Kiddushin 2a-b
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