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What makes a Jewish marriage valid according to the Torah (תורה)? The Rambam (רמב"ם)'s formulation "isha b'kesuva v'kiddushin" seems puzzling since kesuvah is only rabbinic. The shiur develops a fundamental yesod that kesuvah represents the Torah-level obligation of financial responsibility, which must be undertaken alongside kiddushin to create valid marriage and avoid the issur of "lo sihyeh kedeshah."
The shiur opens with a fundamental question on the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s formulation in Hilchos Ishus. The Rambam writes in his heading "lisa isha b'kesuva v'kiddushin" — to marry a woman with kesuvah and kiddushin. The problem is glaring: kesuvah is only a rabbinic obligation (derabbanan), so why does the Rambam list it as part of the Torah (תורה)-level mitzvah (מצוה) of marriage? Furthermore, the order seems backwards — it should be kiddushin first, then kesuvah. The Lechem Mishna is deeply troubled by this formulation. Additional difficulties emerge from other statements in the Rambam. The Rambam writes "she'lo tihyeh isha b'lo kesuva v'kiddushin" — that a woman should not be without kesuvah and kiddushin, language that sounds like a Torah prohibition. Yet the Rambam himself states explicitly in multiple places that the Chachamim instituted kesuvah (shelo tihyeh kalah b'einav l'hotzi'ah). The Rambam also states that a pilegesh (concubine) is "b'li kiddushin u'bli kesuvah," and according to the Lechem Mishna's reading, this constitutes a Torah-level violation of "lo sihyeh kedeshah." How can kesuvah be both rabbinic and part of a Torah prohibition?
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Kiddushin 2a
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