A free account is required to play audio and download files.
No community start suggestion yet.
Why is a sukkah built on stolen land considered a "stolen sukkah" when land itself cannot be stolen? The shiur analyzes Rashi (רש"י) and Tosfos on Sukkah 31a, examining the machlokes between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabanan regarding whether one fulfills the mitzvah (מצוה) in such a sukkah. A central tension emerges: how can sitting on one's own land—even if another built a sukkah there—constitute "sukkah gezulah"?
This shiur analyzes a complex sugya in Masechta Sukkah (31a) addressing the question of sukkah gezulah—a stolen sukkah—and its relationship to the principle that "karka ein nigzeles" (land cannot be stolen). The Gemara (גמרא) discusses a machlokes between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabban Gamliel: Rabbi Eliezer holds that one cannot fulfill the mitzvah (מצוה) of sukkah in a friend's sukkah built on stolen land (karka nigzeles), while Rabban Gamliel holds that even though land cannot be stolen, a sukkah built on stolen land is still valid. The shiur begins by exploring Rashi (רש"י)'s explanation. Rashi states that when karka is stolen, anything attached to the karka (mechubar l'karka) has the status of karka itself, and therefore cannot be stolen. However, the Gemara needs to explain the case of sukkah gezulah specifically, leading to the question: if karka cannot be stolen, why do we need a separate case of sukkah gezulah? Rashi addresses two cases: one where the land itself is stolen (karka nigzeles), and another where someone steals wood (gozel eitz) and builds a sukkah with it. The latter case introduces the concept of Takanas HaShavim (rabbinic enactment for penitents), which allows the thief to keep the stolen materials under certain conditions by paying their value instead of returning them.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Sukkah 31a
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
