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Does muktzeh require mental preparation, or does it depend on whether an item is actually food? The shiur analyzes Beitzah 2a through the lenses of Rashi (רש"י) and the Baal HaMaor, examining how muktzeh interacts with nolad (items that come into existence on Yom Tov). The discussion explores whether Beis Hillel's position means "no muktzeh" or specifically "no nolad," and how this affects practical cases like eggs and nutshells.
The shiur opens with a review of yesterday's fundamental machlokes in understanding the halacha (הלכה) of muktzeh. There are two ways to approach the concept: according to Rashi (רש"י)'s reading of the Gemara (גמרא), muktzeh means something must be mentally prepared—you must have in mind to use it. The alternative understanding, according to the Baal HaMaor, is that the Gemara's conclusion is that there is no muktzeh at all on Yom Tov; things don't need to be prepared. The Baal HaMaor can also be understood to mean that nolad (something that comes into being on Yom Tov) is considered prepared, making the question whether nolad itself can theoretically be prepared. According to the Ran's approach, the distinction is different entirely. The Gemara's havamina (initial assumption) was that muktzeh has nothing to do with preparation—rather, the din of preparation is to make something into food. Therefore, what creates nolad is the fact that something wasn't food and now becomes food; that itself creates the din of nolad. The maskanah (conclusion) of the Gemara, according to this view, is that nolad has nothing to do with food preparation—it's about mental preparation, and you can prepare for the future.
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Beitzah 2a
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