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How can we learn the principle of aseh docheh lo saaseh from the mitzvah (מצוה) of yibum? The shiur analyzes whether the Torah (תורה) allows an aseh to override a lo saaseh because they are equal (shev v'al taaseh resolves the conflict), or because an aseh is inherently stronger. Tosfos' questions on the sugya reveal that the svara of onus rachmana patrai operates only when the competing mitzvos are equal.
This shiur explores the sugya in Yevamos 3b dealing with the foundational principle of aseh docheh lo saaseh (a positive commandment overrides a negative prohibition). The core question is why the Gemara (גמרא) doesn't immediately derive this principle from yibum itself, where the aseh of levirate marriage overrides the lo saaseh of eishes ach (a brother's wife). Tosfos raises several powerful questions on this sugya. First, if the Gemara's question on daf 7 is about aseh docheh lo saaseh, why do we never find a distinction between one and two lo saasehs? Second, why didn't the Gemara raise this question by pesach (פסח) and milah? Third, and most fundamentally, why did the Gemara wait until the end of the sugya to discuss learning from eishes ach? If the question is aseh docheh lo saaseh, that should have been the first place to look.
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Yevamos 3b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
