A free account is required to play audio and download files.
No community start suggestion yet.
What does "Av Zakai BiBito" mean—does the father merely control his daughter's consent, or does he own her? The shiur analyzes the fundamental machlokes between Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafos (תוספות) on Kiddushin 3b, exploring whether the father's right to kiddushin money reflects actual ownership versus mere consent authority. Rabbi Akiva Eiger's five kashas on the sugya are systematically addressed through this lens.
This shiur presents a comprehensive analysis of Kiddushin 3b, focusing on the Gemara (גמרא)'s statement "Av Zakai BiBito" (the father has rights in his daughter) regarding kiddushin through kesef, shetar, and biah. The central question is whether this phrase indicates that the father merely has veto power over his daughter's marriage, or whether he actually owns her in a mammonistic sense. The shiur begins by examining the fundamental machlokes between Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafos (תוספות). According to Rashi, "Av Zakai BiBito" means that the father can perform the kiddushin against the daughter's will (ba'al korcha). The father has the right to refuse consent, and this gives him leverage to demand payment. However, this does not constitute actual ownership—if someone were to live with the daughter without paying, the father would have no claim to collect afterward because there was no kinyan.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Kiddushin 3b
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
