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What does "av zakai b'vito" mean for each type of kiddushin? Rashi (רש"י) explains that by kesef, the daughter may receive the money but the father owns it; by shtar, the father must receive the shtar directly; by bi'ah, the father can give her over al korcha—even against her will. The shiur unpacks these three distinct models and explores the Tosfos-Rashi debate over whether the father truly owns the daughter's body or merely her marriage rights.
The shiur analyzes Rashi (רש"י)'s interpretation of the Mishna's principle that a father is zakai (has rights) in his daughter's kiddushin. Rabbi Zweig demonstrates that Rashi learns three fundamentally different models depending on the mode of kiddushin—kesef, shtar, and bi'ah—each revealing a distinct aspect of the father's ownership. Regarding kiddushin with kesef (money), Rashi explains that the father need not personally receive the money. The daughter may receive the kesef directly, and the father becomes the owner afterward because we require his da'as (consent). Since the kiddushin cannot take effect without the father's agreement, he is considered the makneh (the one effectuating the kinyan), and therefore the money belongs to him. This model treats the father's zakai as a consequence of his required consent rather than as direct ownership of the transaction itself.
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Kiddushin 3b
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