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When the Mishna lists toldos (derivatives) of the avos (primary categories) of damages, must they match the av in halacha (הלכה), or can they differ? The shiur explores whether toldos are defined by sharing the same underlying principle as the av (kavana l'hazik, hana'ah, matzui) or by the physical action/organ that causes the damage. This debate explains why pushing, biting, and kicking might be categorized as keren rather than regel or shen, and whether payment obligation follows.
The Gemara (גמרא) opens with a fundamental question about the nature of avos and toldos in nezikin (damages). By Shabbos (שבת), toldos are ki-yotzei bo—they match the av exactly. By tumah, toldos are lav ki-yotzei bo—they differ. The rishon l'tumah doesn't transmit tumah to a person or vessel the way the av does. The Gemara now asks: in nezikin, are toldos ki-yotzei bo (requiring full payment like the av) or lav ki-yotzei bo (payment differs)? Rashi (רש"י) explains that if toldos are ki-yotzei bo, then the tolda pays just as the av does; if lav ki-yotzei bo, the tolda might not pay at all or might pay a different amount. This raises a fundamental difficulty: a tolda by definition is something similar to the av, something you could almost derive from it. If it is indeed a tolda, how could it not obligate payment? And if it doesn't obligate payment, why call it a tolda at all? The shiur notes that Rashi's formulation here is puzzling, and the major Rishonim struggle to resolve it.
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Bava Kamma 2a-b
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