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The Gemara (גמרא) asks how a shaliach can seize (tofes) a get shichrur on behalf of the slave when that creates chov l'acheirim against the master. The shiur develops Tosafos (תוספות) and the Ran's approach that the master treats the slave as a baal chov (obligor) because the slave has served him faithfully, giving the slave a right of tefisah. This right is not ownership but the ability to resist the master's retraction, activated through zoche l'adam shelo befanav.
This shiur analyzes Gittin 11b's discussion of tofes l'baal chov makom shechov l'acheirim in the context of freeing a slave. The central question is how a shaliach l'holacha (delivery agent) can simultaneously make himself a shaliach l'havah (receiving agent) on behalf of the slave without violating the prohibition against acting as an agent for an aveirah (ein shlichus l'aveirah) when this results in chov l'acheirim—taking something away from the master. Rabbi Zweig begins by explaining the Ran's approach to resolving the problem of ein shlichus l'aveirah. According to the Ran on daf lamed ches, the prohibition of "lo olam bahem ta'avodu" (not enslaving fellow Jews permanently) only applies when the master is doing something purely for the slave's benefit as a favor. However, when the master perceives the act of freeing as remuneration for the slave's years of faithful service (na'ach nafshi), there is no violation. The master isn't acting as a liberal who sees servitude as morally wrong; rather, he's treating the transaction as payment owed for services rendered. This reframes the entire dynamic from gift-giving to debt repayment, eliminating the aveirah aspect.
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Gittin 11b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
