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When does a thief's sale of stolen goods become binding? The shiur analyzes whether yiush (the owner's despair) operates the same way in geneivah (theft) as in aveida (lost objects). Rabbi Zweig develops a fundamental distinction: in aveida, yiush must actively create ownership transfer, but in geneivah the thief already has kinyan geneivah—yiush merely removes the chiyuv hashava (obligation to return). This resolves why yiush lo mida'as (unknowing despair) may work differently in each case.
This shiur delivers a deep analysis of Bava Kamma 58b, focusing on the sugya of whether a thief's sale of stolen property is valid and when yiush (despair of recovery) takes effect. The primary question revolves around the dispute between Rav and Abaye regarding yiush lo mida'as—whether despair can take effect even when the owner doesn't know the item was stolen. Rabbi Zweig begins by establishing that according to Rabbi Elazar, the sale must be l'altar (immediate) and must be a hana meisa (beneficial sale). The Gemara (גמרא) challenges whether the sale can happen before yiush, suggesting that perhaps one must wait until hearing that the owner was miyeish. Tosafos (תוספות) raises a fundamental difficulty: if the principle is stam ganav yiush ba'alav (we assume the owner despairs when something is stolen), then even if the sale isn't immediate, it should still be valid. Why does the Gemara suggest waiting until hearing about yiush?
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Bava Kamma 58b
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