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Can a man be mekadesh a woman with land still attached to the ground? The shiur analyzes the machlokes Rishonim on whether the principle of havaya l'yetzia (comparing marriage laws to divorce laws) makes mechubar l'karka invalid for kiddushin. Four approaches emerge: the Baal HaItur extends the prohibition to all forms of kiddushin, the Ran limits it to kiddushei shtar, the Rambam (רמב"ם) permits even kiddushei shtar, and the Rashba distinguishes between writing on mechubar versus delivering mechubar.
This shiur presents a comprehensive analysis of the sugya in Kiddushin 2a regarding whether one can be mekadesh a woman with karka (land) or mechubar l'karka (something attached to the ground). The central question revolves around the principle of havaya l'yetzia—the Torah (תורה)'s comparison between the laws of marriage (havaya/kiddushin) and divorce (yetzia/gittin). The Gemara (גמרא) in Gittin establishes that a get written on mechubar l'karka is invalid. The Baal HaItur argues that this invalidation extends to all forms of kiddushin based on the hekesh of havaya l'yetzia. He brings proof from the Gemara in Gittin which discusses why mechubar isn't listed among the similarities between gittin and shtarei avadim—because the same law applies to kiddushin, and the Gemara only lists differences. According to the Baal HaItur, whatever is invalid for get must be invalid for all forms of kiddushin, including even kiddushei kesef (monetary kiddushin).
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Kiddushin 2a
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