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Does yiush (despair) transfer ownership of stolen property to the thief? The shiur examines Bava Kamma 56a-b's discussion of whether a thief can return stolen chametz after Pesach (פסח) by saying "harei shelcha lefanecha." The analysis develops the difference between yiush alone versus yiush combined with shinui reshus, and explores the implications for korban gezel—why a stolen korban remains invalid even after yiush.
This shiur analyzes a complex sugya in Bava Kamma dealing with the fundamental question of whether yiush (despair of recovering stolen property) transfers ownership to the thief. The Gemara (גמרא) discusses a case where someone steals chametz and Pesach (פסח) passes. Can the thief say "harei shelcha lefanecha" (here is yours before you) and return the now-worthless chametz to fulfill his obligation to return the stolen item? The core question is whether yiush koneh—whether despair alone effects a transfer of ownership. If yiush is koneh, the chametz now belongs to the thief, and he cannot discharge his obligation by returning "his own" object; he would need to pay monetary compensation. The Gemara's question seems to be: even if yiush koneh, shouldn't the thief be able to say harei shelcha lefanecha? The shiur explores two possible readings of this question. One approach (represented by a student named Shmuel) understands that once yiush koneh, the object literally belongs to the thief and cannot be returned at all. The alternative reading suggests that even if yiush koneh, one could technically return the object, but the problem is that it has decreased in value—it's now merely chaser (lacking value).
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Bava Kamma 56a-56b
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