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Why does the Rambam (רמב"ם) omit da'at amos from kiddushin yet require karov lo, a seemingly contradictory position? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: kiddushin requires not just giving but receiving—the woman must actually benefit and have control. This explains why yochol ishomro is essential for kiddushin but not gittin, and how hefker beis hefker creates a chatzer for kinyan purposes.
This shiur analyzes a fundamental question in the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s piskei halacha (הלכה) regarding kiddushin: why does the Rambam rule that karov lo is sufficient for kiddushin (requiring yochol ishomro, the ability to safeguard), yet omits the halacha of da'at amos? This appears contradictory—on one hand, he is machmir by requiring more than da'at amos, but on the other hand, he is meikel by not requiring toshuach betziklenu (placing in her hand) as gittin does. The shiur explains that toshuach betziklenu is a din of yad—physically putting something into someone's hand. Da'at amos, by contrast, is a kinyan—a form of acquisition. The key insight is that kiddushin requires a fundamentally different mode of transfer than gittin. By gittin, you must give the get to the woman—it must reach her. By kiddushin, however, there are two requirements: (1) you must give it to her, and (2) she must receive something from it. Kiddushin is not baal korcha; it is a transaction where the woman must be mekane herself back in exchange for what she receives.
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Gittin 78b
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