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What is the function of witnesses in a divorce? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction in the Ran and Rambam (רמב"ם): witnesses need not testify to the physical transfer of the get, but must be present at the moment of transfer to declare the woman divorced—because divorce is a state matter requiring communal knowledge, not merely a private transaction.
Rabbi Zweig delivers an in-depth analysis of the role of witnesses (eidim) in the gittin process, focusing primarily on Gittin 4a and exploring a fundamental machlokes between Tosafos (תוספות) and the Mordechai regarding whether a woman is divorced when witnesses did not realize a get was being given at the moment of transfer but discovered it afterward. The Mordechai holds she is not divorced because the witnesses lacked knowledge at the actual moment (b'shas meisa), while Tosafos and most Rishonim hold she is divorced. The shiur then examines a parallel case in kiddushin brought by the Beit Shmuel citing the Rama: if witnesses see a ring in the man's hand and later in the woman's hand but did not actually witness the transfer (nisina), is the kiddushin valid? The Mordechai holds it is valid based on a principle of eidus yedida (knowledge-based testimony), while the Rashba holds it is not valid because witnesses must have eidus re'iya (visual testimony). Rabbi Zweig proposes that the distinction lies in whether the witnesses saw the action of transfer itself—even if they did not see the ring during its movement—versus cases where they saw no action at all.
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Gittin 4a
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