No community start suggestion yet.
When does the prohibition of bal tachar (delaying fulfillment of vows) take effect—immediately or after three festivals? The shiur analyzes major disputes among Rishonim on bal tachar by nazirus, korbanos, and giluach. A key focus is the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s omission of bal tachar by taglachas, possibly because if giluach cannot be done late, there's no bal tachar—only bal yachel.
This shiur presents a comprehensive analysis of Nedarim 4a and the prohibition of bal tachar (delaying fulfillment of vows), examining when this issur applies across different types of nedarim. The discussion focuses on major disputes among the Rishonim regarding the timing and scope of bal tachar. The Ran holds that for the case of "lo yafter min ha-olam" (immediate fulfillment) you are over bal tachar immediately (miyad). Similarly, by "noder b'vesach paros" (vowing inside the courtyard) you're over bal tachar if you don't leave right away. However, by bal taglachas (the prohibition regarding shaving after nazirus), the Ran says nothing. By korbanos, he says the issur applies after gimor regel (three festivals). The Rambam (רמב"ם)'s position appears similar—he rules you're over bal tachar immediately by nazirus in certain cases, after gimor regel by korbanos. Yet the Rambam paskens in Hilchos Maaser that b'chol yom v'yom (every single day) you are over bal tachar, a ruling that does not appear in his discussion of nazirus. This raises fundamental questions about the Rambam's shita.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Nedarim 4a
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
