A free account is required to play audio and download files.
No community start suggestion yet.
Why does the Rashba offer two different explanations for the kiddushin formula of nasan hu v'amrah hi—first as a "chisaron ki yikach" (deficiency in "when a man takes") and then as a safek? The shiur analyzes the underlying distinction between restructuring the ma'aseh kiddushin versus creating a chisaron in the eidus (testimony), exploring how the giving party's ability to set conditions affects the validity of kiddushin.
The shiur opens with an apparent contradiction in the Rashba's analysis of nasan hu v'amrah hi (he gives and she says). Initially, the Rashba states it is a "chisaron ki yikach," while later he presents it as a safek. Rabbi Zweig resolves this by distinguishing between two types of questions: first, whether restructuring the kiddushin is valid, and second, whether there is sufficient eidus (testimony) when the kiddushin structure is altered. The first approach follows the Gemara (גמרא)'s initial position that nasan hu v'amrah hi represents a complete restructuring of the kinyan. When the woman defines how the kinyan works—making herself mukdeshes to him—this fundamentally alters the nature of the transaction and is therefore invalid. The second approach, corresponding to the Gemara's second position, questions whether such restructuring constitutes a halachic deficiency at all. This becomes a sfeik d'dina (halachic uncertainty) rather than an absolute disqualification.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Kiddushin 5b
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
