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Why is a par's horn disqualified for shofar? The Mishna says it's called "keren," but Rabbeinu Yosef argues all shofars are called keren. The shiur analyzes Rashi (רש"י)'s approach—that the issue is the absence of the term "shofar"—versus other Rishonim who hold it's passul only because the Torah (תורה) specifically calls it keren. A deeper exploration ties this to the principle of "ein kateigor naaseh saneigor."
The shiur opens with the Mishna on Rosh Hashanah 26a, which states that all shofars are kosher except for the horn of a par (cow), because a par's horn is called a "keren" rather than a "shofar." Rabbeinu Yosef challenges this, asserting that all shofars are also called keren, which would seem to disqualify all of them. This leads to a fundamental question: Is the disqualification of par based on it being called keren, or on it not being called shofar? Rashi (רש"י)'s position emerges as central to the analysis. Rashi understands the Mishna to mean that the par is disqualified because it lacks the name "shofar," not merely because it is called keren. According to Rashi, a horn must be called shofar to be kosher, whether in the language of the Torah (תורה) or in common parlance (as the Meiri explains, "melashon bnei adam"). This reading implies that if something is neither called keren nor shofar, it would be disqualified.
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Rosh Hashanah 26a
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