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Does da'as amos create ownership mid'oraisa or only mid'rabbanan? The shiur analyzes a fundamental debate between the Ran and Ramban (רמב"ן). While the Ran argues da'as amos works like chatzer (mid'oraisa), the Ramban holds it's kinyan d'rabbanan that permits remarriage via afkinhu rabbanan kidushin. The shiur proposes several novel approaches to resolve how a kinyan d'rabbanan could create kedushin d'oraisa.
This shiur presents a detailed analysis of Gittin 78a-b, focusing on a fundamental question: Is da'as amos (the kinyan of one's four amos in public domain) a kinyan d'rabbanan or d'oraisa, and how does this affect gittin and kiddushin? Rabbi Zweig begins by examining Tosafos (תוספות)'s difficulty reconciling two seemingly contradictory passages in the Gemara (גמרא). Rav Ashi (in another passage) holds that da'as amos does not work in reshus harabim, only in simta or the side of reshus harabim, yet our Mishna clearly states that throwing a get in reshus harabim effects a divorce through da'as amos. Tosafos offers two approaches: either the case must be where she can guard the get (yechola lishmoer), or the Gemara doesn't actually mean reshus harabim but rather a simta adjacent to reshus harabim. The Rambam (רמב"ם)'s position creates additional difficulties - he rules like Rav Ashi that da'as amos doesn't work in reshus harabim, yet also rules that throwing a get in reshus harabim is valid. This apparent contradiction requires explanation.
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Gittin 78a-b
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