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Can a Frenchman recite Shema in French while visiting America? The Birkei Yosef rules that a foreign language only works for mitzvos in places where that language is spoken—elsewhere it's not considered a "language" at all. The shiur analyzes this striking position through the Ridvaz's proof from nedarim and a sugya in Kiddushin about the word "charufasi," exploring the fundamental question of what makes something a language versus mere dialect.
This shiur examines a fascinating halachic question: does the validity of a foreign language for fulfilling mitzvos depend on where you are standing? The discussion centers on a chiddush of the Birkei Yosef who rules that a person can only fulfill obligations like Kriyas Shema in a foreign language if he is in a place where that language is spoken. According to this view, a Frenchman saying Shema in French while in France would be yotzei, but the same person saying the same words in the United States would not be—because French is not the language of that place. Rabbi Zweig questions this svara intensely. The Birkei Yosef's reasoning is that all languages besides Lashon Kodesh are merely agreements (haskama) among people, and if the people in a particular place don't speak that language, it's not considered a language there at all. But this seems provincial: we all know that French is a legitimate language spoken by millions, with a vast literature. How can we say it's "not a language" in America just because Americans don't speak it? The same question applies even more forcefully to Chinese, spoken by over a billion people—yet according to this shita, a Chinese person in America reciting Shema in Chinese would not be yotzei.
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Nedarim 4a
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