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Can one fulfill a mitzvah (מצוה) with a stolen object if someone else uses it? The shiur analyzes the Magen Avrohom's sophisticated reading of Sukkah 30b, exploring when mitzvah haba'ah ba'aveirah applies—whether it depends on illegal taking versus illegal using, and how yei'ush and shinui reshus affect the second party's ability to make a berachah or fulfill the mitzvah of lulav.
This shiur presents a detailed analysis of Gemara (גמרא) Sukkah 30b and the Magen Avrohom's commentary on hilchos berachos and mitzvah (מצוה) haba'ah ba'aveirah (a mitzvah that comes through a transgression). The discussion centers on whether one may make a berachah or fulfill a mitzvah with a stolen object, particularly when there has been yei'ush (despair of recovery by the owner) and the object has passed to a second party. The shiur begins by examining the Magen Avrohom's first challenge regarding berachos. According to Rashi (רש"י), the Gemara's question concerns mitzvah haba'ah ba'aveirah, not the requirement of lachem (ownership). The Magen Avrohom asks: if yei'ush is not koneh (does not effect acquisition), why would the Gemara suggest that an avanakri (non-Jew) could acquire through shinui reshus (change of domain)? Rabbi Zweig explores whether yei'ush creates a heter (permission) to be koneh even if it doesn't create kinyan (acquisition) itself, which would distinguish between the din of mitzvah and the din of berachah.
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Sukkah 30b
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