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Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara (גמרא)'s derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam (רמב"ם)'s position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
The shiur opens with an analysis of Rashi (רש"י)'s understanding of the Gemara (גמרא)'s question regarding the lashon of "kinyan" in kiddushin. The fundamental issue is whether the Gemara is troubled by an inconsistency in terminology or by a deeper conceptual problem. Tosafos (תוספות) asks why we make a gezeirah shavah of ki'ach ki'ach from Sayeffron when there the Torah (תורה) discusses taking money (the seller's perspective) while here it discusses taking the woman. This technical difficulty leads to a broader investigation of what the Gemara is trying to prove. Three fundamental approaches to understanding the Gemara's intent emerge from the discussion. The first possibility is that the Gemara seeks to establish whether ishus (marriage) constitutes a kinyan at all—whether the woman becomes "owned" by the husband in some halachic sense. According to this reading, the gezeirah shavah from Sayeffron's sale of the Me'aras HaMachpelah proves that just as Avrohom acquired the field, so too marriage is an acquisition. The second approach suggests the Gemara already knows marriage is not technically a kinyan; the question is merely why the Torah uses kinyan terminology. The answer would be that since kesef (money) is used, and money is associated with kinyan, the Torah employs kinyan language even though no actual acquisition occurs. The third interpretation holds that we always knew ishus results in the woman belonging to the husband, but the question is whether the mechanism—specifically kesef—operates as a ma'aseh kinyan (an act of acquisition) or merely effects a kinyan without being a kinyan act itself, analogous to yerusha (inheritance) where something becomes yours without your performing an act of kinyan.
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Kiddushin 2a
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