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Why doesn't a conditional gift (matanah al menas lehachzir) create a valid kinyan for transactions like kiddushin or pidyon haben? The shiur develops the foundational principle that the obligation to return the object is not merely a side condition from hilchos tana'im, but rather the essential exchange itself—you owe the object back because that was the stipulated "price." Since you never truly own what you must return, it cannot serve as a medium of kinyan.
This shiur explores the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion in Kiddushin 6b regarding matanah al menas lehachzir—a gift given on condition that it be returned. The central question is why such a conditional gift cannot be used to effect a kinyan in contexts like kiddushin (marriage), pidyon haben (redemption of the firstborn), or even as a means of acquiring land. Rabbi Zweig begins by examining the Gemara's question: if Rava stated that matanah al menas lehachzir is not considered a valid matanah (gift), why does the Gemara need to ask this question from multiple contexts? The difficulty is compounded by the fact that the Gemara brings a proof from the case of terumah, which seems to have different dynamics than standard kinyan cases.
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Kiddushin 6b
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