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Can we derive the principle of aseh docheh lo taaseh from yibum or the metzora's requirement to shave his peyos? The shiur analyzes whether these cases constitute genuine instances of a mitzvah (מצוה) overriding a prohibition or are instead examples of mitzvas habechach—where the prohibition was never meant to apply in that context.
This shiur undertakes a detailed analysis of the Gemara (גמרא)'s attempt to derive the principle of aseh docheh lo taaseh (a positive commandment overrides a negative prohibition) from the case of yibum (levirate marriage) and the metzora's shaving of his peyos. The central question revolves around whether these sources genuinely illustrate a conflict between an aseh and a lo taaseh that the aseh resolves, or whether they represent a different category entirely—mitzvas habechach, where the prohibition was never intended to apply. The discussion begins with Yevamos 5a, where the Gemara questions why we don't learn aseh docheh lo taaseh sheish bechor (a positive commandment overriding a prohibition punishable by kares) from the fact that yibum permits what would otherwise be the severe prohibition of eishes ach (a brother's wife). Tosafos (תוספות) asks: if yibum demonstrates that an aseh can override even severe prohibitions, why can't we derive from this that an aseh overrides lo taaseh sheish bechor generally, and even permit achashveros isha (one's wife's sister) through yibum when there are two prohibitions involved?
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Yevamos 5a
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