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If everyone in your location uses the term "konam" for korban but you don't understand it, is your neder valid? The shiur analyzes whether neder-language is real communication requiring comprehension or technical terminology requiring only awareness of creating a binding result. The Beis Yosef and Rama's dispute turns on whether saying the neder (motzi besefasav) creates the chalos or voices the internal commitment.
This shiur examines a fundamental dispute regarding the language requirements for nedarim. The Gemara (גמרא) in Nedarim 2a discusses kinuyim—alternate terms for korban used in making vows. The central question is whether someone who uses a kinuy must personally understand its meaning, or whether it suffices that the term is recognized in that location, even if the individual speaker doesn't comprehend it. The Rama rules in Yoreh De'ah that if a person uses a term like "konam" in a place where everyone understands it means korban, but he himself doesn't know what it means, the neder is invalid. The Beis Yosef brings a different case: if someone uses a term that nobody in that location recognizes (even though he personally understands it), it's also invalid. The Chavos Yair (Rav Kiveger) asks a powerful question: these are two entirely different cases. How can the Rama prove his ruling (that personal understanding is required even when everyone else understands) from the Beis Yosef's case (where nobody in the location uses that language)?
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Nedarim 2a
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