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Why is one permitted to be shekalim o shekalim (fulfill a public obligation on behalf of someone from whom one is forbidden to benefit by vow)? The Ran holds it's a case of ma'avir achari dikdushah (transferring something sacred), while the Rosh holds it's mutar because mitzvah (מצוה) kavod (mitzvah performance overrides the prohibition). The shiur explores how this machlokes impacts the parallel case of hasheves aveidah (returning lost objects).
The shiur opens with a detailed analysis of the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of shekalim o shekalim—a case where one is permitted to contribute the half-shekel on behalf of someone from whom he is forbidden to benefit due to a neder (vow). The fundamental question is: what is the heter (permissive mechanism) that allows this action, given that it appears to violate the prohibition against deriving or giving benefit? The Ran and Rosh offer fundamentally different approaches. The Ran explains that shekalim o shekalim is permitted because it is a case of ma'avir achari dikdushah—transferring something that has already entered the realm of sanctity. Once the shekel has kedushas bedek habayis (sanctity of the Temple treasury), the prohibition of ma'avir achari (transferring benefit through an intermediary) does not apply in the same way. According to this view, the permissibility is limited to the specific context of dikdushah.
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Nedarim 34a
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