No community start suggestion yet.
Why is one permitted to be shekalim o shekalim (fulfill a public obligation on behalf of someone from whom one is forbidden to benefit by vow)? The Ran holds it's a case of ma'avir achari dikdushah (transferring something sacred), while the Rosh holds it's mutar because mitzvah (מצוה) kavod (mitzvah performance overrides the prohibition). The shiur explores how this machlokes impacts the parallel case of hasheves aveidah (returning lost objects).
The shiur opens with a detailed analysis of the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of shekalim o shekalim—a case where one is permitted to contribute the half-shekel on behalf of someone from whom he is forbidden to benefit due to a neder (vow). The fundamental question is: what is the heter (permissive mechanism) that allows this action, given that it appears to violate the prohibition against deriving or giving benefit? The Ran and Rosh offer fundamentally different approaches. The Ran explains that shekalim o shekalim is permitted because it is a case of ma'avir achari dikdushah—transferring something that has already entered the realm of sanctity. Once the shekel has kedushas bedek habayis (sanctity of the Temple treasury), the prohibition of ma'avir achari (transferring benefit through an intermediary) does not apply in the same way. According to this view, the permissibility is limited to the specific context of dikdushah.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Nedarim 34a
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
