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When someone mentions Hashem (ה׳)'s name in vain, what is the din of nidui—is it a punishment for the speaker, or a requirement for the listener to protest? The shiur develops the fundamental machloket between the Ran (who views nidui as an onesh on the maskir) and the Rambam (who reads the Gemara (גמרא) as imposing a chiyuv on the listener to distance himself from blasphemy, making it a "hostile environment" rather than allowing silent acquiescence).
This shiur presents a fundamental analysis of the sugya in Nedarim 7a dealing with one who hears hazkarat Shem Shamayim l'vatala (mentioning God's name in vain). The central question is: what is the nature of the din of nidui in this case? The shiur begins by examining the Gemara (גמרא)'s statement that kol makom she'hazkarat Hashem (ה׳) matzui sham, ani matzui—wherever God's name is commonly mentioned [in vain], I [nidui/excommunication] am present. The Duran's explanation raises immediate difficulties: he suggests the severity stems from the parsha of shvu'ot (oaths), but this seems circular—why derive the existence of onesh (punishment) from the chumra (severity) of the subject matter itself? Additionally, the Ran asks: apikorsus (heresy) should be more severe than hazkarat Hashem, yet by apikorsus there is no din of "hu atzmo yehei b'nidui" (automatic nidui). How can hazkarat Hashem be treated more stringently?
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Nedarim 7a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
