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When someone mentions Hashem (ה׳)'s name in vain, what is the din of nidui—is it a punishment for the speaker, or a requirement for the listener to protest? The shiur develops the fundamental machloket between the Ran (who views nidui as an onesh on the maskir) and the Rambam (who reads the Gemara (גמרא) as imposing a chiyuv on the listener to distance himself from blasphemy, making it a "hostile environment" rather than allowing silent acquiescence).
This shiur presents a fundamental analysis of the sugya in Nedarim 7a dealing with one who hears hazkarat Shem Shamayim l'vatala (mentioning God's name in vain). The central question is: what is the nature of the din of nidui in this case? The shiur begins by examining the Gemara (גמרא)'s statement that kol makom she'hazkarat Hashem (ה׳) matzui sham, ani matzui—wherever God's name is commonly mentioned [in vain], I [nidui/excommunication] am present. The Duran's explanation raises immediate difficulties: he suggests the severity stems from the parsha of shvu'ot (oaths), but this seems circular—why derive the existence of onesh (punishment) from the chumra (severity) of the subject matter itself? Additionally, the Ran asks: apikorsus (heresy) should be more severe than hazkarat Hashem, yet by apikorsus there is no din of "hu atzmo yehei b'nidui" (automatic nidui). How can hazkarat Hashem be treated more stringently?
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Nedarim 7a
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