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When an eshes ish lives with a goy, is she forbidden to her husband? Rabbeinu Tam holds bias akum is like bias behema and she may remain permitted to her husband through achshavah. The Rivav challenges this with four strong proofs that she becomes forbidden regardless.
This shiur analyzes a fundamental dispute between Rabbeinu Tam and the Rivav regarding the status of an eshes ish who lives with a goy. The Gemara (גמרא) in Kesubos discusses the case of Esther and raises the question of whether certain relationships create the prohibition of yeharog v'al ya'avor. Rabbeinu Tam's position is that bias akum (relations with a non-Jew) is comparable to bias behema (relations with an animal). Just as there is no chiyuv misah for the latter, there is similarly no chiyuv misah for bias akum because 'rachmana afkarei l'zara' - the Torah (תורה) considers the offspring as if they don't belong to the father. This leads to his conclusion that there may be no prohibition of yeharog v'al ya'avor in such cases.
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Kesubos 3b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
