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When an eshes ish lives with a goy, is she forbidden to her husband? Rabbeinu Tam holds bias akum is like bias behema and she may remain permitted to her husband through achshavah. The Rivav challenges this with four strong proofs that she becomes forbidden regardless.
This shiur analyzes a fundamental dispute between Rabbeinu Tam and the Rivav regarding the status of an eshes ish who lives with a goy. The Gemara (גמרא) in Kesubos discusses the case of Esther and raises the question of whether certain relationships create the prohibition of yeharog v'al ya'avor. Rabbeinu Tam's position is that bias akum (relations with a non-Jew) is comparable to bias behema (relations with an animal). Just as there is no chiyuv misah for the latter, there is similarly no chiyuv misah for bias akum because 'rachmana afkarei l'zara' - the Torah (תורה) considers the offspring as if they don't belong to the father. This leads to his conclusion that there may be no prohibition of yeharog v'al ya'avor in such cases.
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Kesubos 3b
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