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When a rooster drags a coal on its foot, causing damage, is this keren (goring) or regel (trampling)? The shiur examines why Rashi (רש"י) holds the question is whether this unusual manner qualifies as regel, while the Rambam (רמב"ם) and Rosh frame it as safek keren/safek regel. The central difficulty: how can tfisa (seizure) apply when knas (fine) liability requires a beis din ruling?
This shiur analyzes a complex sugya in Bava Kamma 19b concerning the liability when a rooster drags a coal with its foot, causing damage. The fundamental question is whether this case is considered a tolda of regel (trampling) or keren (goring). Rabbi Zweig begins by examining Rashi (רש"י)'s interpretation, which appears to frame the safek as whether this unusual manner of damage qualifies as regel at all, not whether it's keren versus regel. The Gemara (גמרא)'s sequence is critical: it initially asks why this shouldn't be keren (since the Torah (תורה) says "ki yugach"), then suggests it's regel, and finally questions whether excessive scratching is still regel. According to Rabbi Zweig's reading of Rashi, the fundamental question is whether unusual regel behavior obligates payment in reshus harabim (public domain) or not. This differs markedly from the Rambam (רמב"ם) and Rosh, who both frame the issue as a safek between keren and regel.
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Bava Kamma 19b
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