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How can a nazir shave during his taharah process when there's an issur of "sar lo yavo rosho"? The Gemara (גמרא)'s principle of yeshno b'sheila and the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s explanation that the ase falls away create multiple unresolved difficulties. The shiur analyzes Rashi (רש"י), Tosafos (תוספות), the Avnei Miluim, and Rav Chaim to understand how ase docha lo sase works by nazir.
This advanced Gemara (גמרא) shiur tackles a complex sugya in Yevamos 5a, analyzing multiple approaches to understanding how the ase (positive commandment) of a nazir's taglachas (shaving ritual) is docha (overrides) the lo sase (negative commandment) of cutting his hair. The shiur opens by identifying five or six unresolved difficulties in the Gemara and promises "a brand new pshat in the Gemara." The first major issue concerns Rashi (רש"י)'s approach. Rashi explains that the Gemara proves ase docha lo sase sheyesh bo kares (where violating carries a kares penalty) from the case of nazir. Yet Tosafos (תוספות) asks: what about the case of amono lekayem godo (living with one's deceased brother's wife to fulfill the yibum obligation)? Tosafos establishes a hierarchy: lo sase she'eino shova bakol (not applicable to everyone—50%), lo sase of amono lekayem godo min ha'arayos (75%), and lo sase shova bakol (100%). The question arises: how does the Gemara know to derive shova bakol rather than just moving from one level of einu shova bakol to another?
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Yevamos 5a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
