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When does "beyado" (in one's power to fix) prevent a mitzvah (מצוה) object from being disqualified through dichui (being pushed off)? The shiur explores the fundamental dispute between Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafot on whether beyado only neutralizes dichui mikar (initial pushing-off) or extends to nir venitzcha (retroactive pushing-off). The analysis reveals competing understandings of whether physical ability to fix or legal ability determines the beyado status.
This shiur presents an in-depth analysis of the concept of dichui (disqualification through being "pushed off") in the context of mitzvah (מצוה) objects, specifically focusing on the lulav on Yom Tov and the principle of beyado (when the remedy is in one's hands). Rabbi Zweig begins by reviewing the distinction between dichui mikar (initial pushing-off, when something was never eligible) and nir venitzcha (retroactive pushing-off, when something became ineligible after initially being valid). The shiur centers on a fundamental disagreement between Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafot regarding when beyado prevents dichui. According to the Gemara (גמרא) in Zevachim, beyado helps for nir venitzcha—if it's in your power to fix something, the retroactive disqualification doesn't take effect. However, Tosafot raises a critical difficulty: in multiple sugyot (including hameir dosso, nifka mizbeyach, and Succah 33b), beyado does not prevent dichui from taking effect even though the person could theoretically fix the problem. Why is beyado effective in Zevachim but not in these other cases?
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Succah 33a-b
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