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When does "beyado" (in one's power to fix) prevent a mitzvah (מצוה) object from being disqualified through dichui (being pushed off)? The shiur explores the fundamental dispute between Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafot on whether beyado only neutralizes dichui mikar (initial pushing-off) or extends to nir venitzcha (retroactive pushing-off). The analysis reveals competing understandings of whether physical ability to fix or legal ability determines the beyado status.
This shiur presents an in-depth analysis of the concept of dichui (disqualification through being "pushed off") in the context of mitzvah (מצוה) objects, specifically focusing on the lulav on Yom Tov and the principle of beyado (when the remedy is in one's hands). Rabbi Zweig begins by reviewing the distinction between dichui mikar (initial pushing-off, when something was never eligible) and nir venitzcha (retroactive pushing-off, when something became ineligible after initially being valid). The shiur centers on a fundamental disagreement between Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafot regarding when beyado prevents dichui. According to the Gemara (גמרא) in Zevachim, beyado helps for nir venitzcha—if it's in your power to fix something, the retroactive disqualification doesn't take effect. However, Tosafot raises a critical difficulty: in multiple sugyot (including hameir dosso, nifka mizbeyach, and Succah 33b), beyado does not prevent dichui from taking effect even though the person could theoretically fix the problem. Why is beyado effective in Zevachim but not in these other cases?
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Succah 33a-b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
